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CEO Compensation Structure and Capital Ratios at US Banks
Bradley Heuer-LaSalle University

1. INTRODUCTION
The banking industry operates as an important part of everyday American life. Millions of
Americans use banks as a financial instrument through which they can make deposits and take out
loans. CEOs, in charge of banks across the US, are some of the highest paid employees in America.
Because of their high pay and relative power over business decisions, compensation practice has
become a widely discussed topic among government officials. Executives can be compensated in two
ways: one way would be to pay the executive in cash, whereas the other method would be to pay the
executive in incentives (discussed later in this paper). The worry among government officials is that
certain types of compensation can lead to bank riskiness and failure which in turn may cause a general
mistrust of banks across America.
A recent bank failure can provide an example of executive compensation practices promoting
bank riskiness and failure. Westsound bank was closed on May 8, 2009 by the FDIC. In closing the bank,
the FDIC published a Material Loss Review which reviewed reasons for why the bank was to be closed. A
discussion of risk management practices and failed compensation practices is seen in the report.
Westbound Westsound failed because its board of directors and management did not implement riskmanagement practices commensurate with rapid growth and a loan portfolio with significant
concentrations in higher-risk acquisition, development and construction (ADC) real estate loans.
Specifically, weak loan underwriting and credit administration practices associated with ADC
concentrations became apparent as the local real estate market deteriorated. As loan losses related to
the ADC loans were recognized, capital eroded and liquidity became strained. A contributing factor to
the losses was an inadequately designed and monitored incentive compensation program under which
one bank official generated the vast majority of the poor quality loans. Westsound’s viability was also
impacted by negative publicity which prompted depositors to leave the bank.1 Simply stated, Westsound
bank took risks because executive compensation practices incentivized certain bank officials to generate
massive returns for themselves, while simultaneously putting the bank at risk for failure.
It is easy to see the importance of both executive pay structure and capital ratios. This paper will
seek to establish a relationship between the two. It’s important to define what this paper will look at in
terms of executive compensation and what capital ratios it will look at as well. Many studies have been
published trying to establish a relationship between certain aspects of executive compensation. To
continue these studies, this paper will discuss banks in America and will seek to establish a relationship
between CEO compensation and capital ratios at these banks. That relationship will be defined as
follows: The higher percentage of incentive based pay the CEO is compensated with, the lower the
capital ratios, indicating a riskier bank. To begin, a simplified background on the functions of a bank will
be provided. Next, this paper will introduce the agencies that monitor banks and provide a brief
background of those agencies. The next section will discuss the capital ratios and aspects of executive
compensation. A discussion of previous studies will follow. Then, a relationship between executive
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compensation and capital ratios will be established using regression analysis. Next, results from
regression analysis, using these two variables, will be displayed and interpreted. The paper will end with
a conclusion about this relationship. The goal is to better understand this relationship in the hopes of
helping future regulators monitor banks.
The Balance Sheet
Commercial banks play an important part in the financial industry by providing a safe way for
people to deposit cash and borrow money. Even though this seems simple, banks can become
complicated with their use of different financial tools that they provide to their customers. To better
understand what a bank does, it’s easier to break it down into the different parts of a banks’ balance
sheet.
A bank performs two important operations in daily activities. The liability side of a bank contains
deposits. Deposits are a tool through which customers can safely invest their disposable income so that
they can save it for spending later. Deposits provide a bank with the money it needs to make a profit
through its daily operations, such as providing loans. Banks offer a rate of return on deposits to attract
customers. This rate of return changes based on the type of deposit account a customer has with the
bank.
The asset side of a bank does the exact opposite of taking money in; it lends money out. As
stated above deposits provide a source of money to a bank so it can write loans. Loans are a tool banks
use to provide money to individuals or businesses. For example, a bank may lend individuals money so
they can purchase a house. Also, it may lend money to someone to start a business, or for a large
company to build infrastructure. Customers are required to pay this loan back over a specified period of
time. In addition, banks charge an interest on loans to compensate the bank for lending out money to
customers rather than using the money for some other investment activity. The interest rate a bank
charges on a loan is based on many factors and reflects the credit risk (chance money is not paid back)
of the loan. Riskier loans have higher interest rates because there is a higher percent of default meaning
the bank does not receive its money back from the customer and charges off the loan (removes it from
the balance sheet).
At most banks liabilities and assets are not equal. This means that a bank’s assets, or
loans/investments, are not fully funded by its liabilities, or deposits. To fund the rest of its assets, a bank
will have a third section on its balance sheet: equity. Equity will consist of the market value of the shares
of stock invested in a bank plus any net income from the previous year that was retained. It is then
added to the previous balance of retained earnings. But at a bank equity is referred to as capital. Capital
has an important role at a bank acting as a safety net for the bank. It provides safety if for some reason
many charge-offs occur and the bank is unable to recover the money lent to these customers. Capital is
built in to prevent the bank from becoming insolvent by covering these losses. A bank can raise capital
through a few means. One common way would be by selling shares of stock. Another way is by adding
to retained earnings using income from the previous year.
In summary, a bank takes deposits and makes loans. Banks offer different deposit accounts, with
a higher rate of return, to attract customers to longer-term deposits. These deposits allow a bank to
make loans to an individual or business. Banks charge an interest rate on these loans, a rate higher than
the one they provide on their deposit accounts. Banks profit from the interest margin. A bank also
2

profits by investing in securities. Capital is also on a banks’ balance sheet. It provides a safety net if
customers were to stop paying back their loans. Banks are an important part of the American economy,
and because of this are regulated by the government.
Regulators
There are several regulators of banks across the United States, but for the purposes of this
paper, this section will discuss three of the primary regulators: The Federal Reserve (Fed), The Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Together,
these three regulators work with one another to ensure that banks are operating safely and soundly.
Regulators also provide consumer protection and work for a more stable economy as a whole.
One regulator of banks in the United States is the Federal Reserve System. The Fed acts as the
central bank in the US through which monetary policy is enacted. Monetary policy is the tool through
which the Federal Reserve controls interest rates. The purpose of controlling interest rates is to keep the
economy stable to prevent future recessions. The Fed also monitors and regulates state banks. A state
bank is a member of the Federal Reserve System through an application, and is typically smaller than
larger national banks, or banks with assets of over $50 billion. The Fed assists the other two regulators in
monitoring and regulating larger US banks. The Fed is also the primary regulator for bank holding
companies in the US. A bank holding company is a company that owns banks and they are typically set
up for the purposes of raising capital for its subsidiary banks.
Another regulator of banks in the US is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Similar to
the Fed, the OCC supervises and monitors banks to ensure that banks aren’t becoming too risky. The
OCC helps the Fed by regulating national banks. A bank is considered a national bank when it has assets
that total over $50 billion. National banks are all members of the Federal Reserve System, but the OCC is
the primary regulator for these banks.
Similar to the Fed and the OCC, the FDIC helps to supervise and monitor banks. If a state bank
(smaller bank) is not a member of the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC becomes that bank’s primary
regulator. In addition, the FDIC also insures deposits of up to $250,000. This implies that if a bank were
to go out of business, those customers would not lose their deposits because the FDIC insures them and
will reimburse deposits held in that bank.
Together, these three agencies establish laws that prevent banks from becoming too risky. In
addition, banks must go through regular exams from at least one of these three regulators. During these
exams, bank examiners look at the financial statements and give the bank a rating. This rating is based
on how well the bank is running its daily operations while also being risk averse. A lower rating may
indicate a “problem institution,” meaning the bank may go out of business. These exams ensure that
banks are able to stay in business, while providing peace of mind to customers who use the bank on a
daily basis.
During exams, banks are rated on a scale of 1, the best score a bank can receive, to a 5, the
worst score a bank can receive. Examiners look at 6 main aspects of a bank’s financial statements when
on an exam. The acronym CAMELS describes what examiners look at. C stands for Capital Adequacy,
meaning that examiners ensure banks have sufficient capital to run its daily business and write loans.
For the purpose of this paper, and its goal of establishing a relationship between executive
3

compensation and capital ratios, I will only look at the C in CAMELS. Capital ratios play an important role
in banking because they exemplify if a bank can withstand some adverse situation, such as an economic
downturn or an increase in charge-offs. Capital ratios provide a measure of capital risk at banks. The
higher the capital ratio, the lower the capital risk and vice versa. They also show a bank’s ability to write
more or less loans. Executive salary also plays an important role at a bank and is observed when
examiners rate management, or the M, at a bank. This paper will examine this relationship, between
executive salary and capital ratios, with the goal of assisting bank regulators in the future.
Executive Compensation, Capital Ratios and Risk
The board of directors plays a key role in the daily activities of the bank. The board consists of
people both inside and outside of bank management. Some members of executive management may sit
on the board, such as the CEO of the bank. The board communicates to executive management on
behalf of the policy holders. In addition, the board is in charge of oversight of the bank, but does not
manage the bank on daily basis. The board ensures that management reaching objective’s to meet the
banks’ risk appetite.2
The board is also responsible for creating and implementing a compensation policy for upper
level management.3 Compensation should allow a financial institution to attract, retain, and motivate
qualified management adhering to standards applicable to a safe and sound organization while creating
value for shareholders and other stated stakeholders.4 The board’s responsibility when devising a
compensation structure is to create a program that allows upper level management to effectively run
the bank. It is also used to promote certain risk taking, by executive management, at a bank. It is
believed that some forms of compensation promote risk as opposed to others. Bank regulatory agencies
throughout the world believe that poorly structured incentive compensation programs encouraged
bankers to pursue financial and business strategies that overly rewarded excessive risk leading to failure
before and during the Panic of 20085 the most recent financial crisis in the US. In response, the agencies
devised laws in the hopes that executive compensation structures would be better managed to avoid
excessive risk taking.
Executives at banks manage risk using risk management practices. Risk management represents
the process by which a bank identifies and controls their exposure to risk6. It is management’s
responsibility to develop and monitor risk management practices to ensure the bank does not fail. After
the crisis of 2008, there was a belief that incentive based compensation, such as stock options or equity,
led to executive management not properly developing risk management practices that would keep the
bank safe. A Forbes article from 2011 stated “actions motivated by short-term self-interest on the part
of those in the financial services industry brought about near collapse of our financial system in 2008
and 2009.” In other words, the ones in the financial world who benefitted, despite deep financial woes,
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were the ones who also reaped the most handsome rewards. This has caused regulators to become
weary of compensation structure because of its possible association with risk taking at banks.
Executive compensation is defined as the financial payments and non-monetary benefits
provided to high level management in exchange for their work on behalf of an organization. Typically all
upper level management fall under this term, but this paper will look at compensation of the CEO.
Executive compensation has a few different parts. The first is base salary. This is the fixed dollar amount
that an executive is paid per year. Another part is any bonuses provided to the CEO. Both salary and
bonuses are considered cash-based forms of compensation. Equity-based compensation occurs when
executives are compensated with shares of stock in the company. Equity-based compensation is seen as
an incentive form of payment because it is not required to be paid to an executive, whereas salary is
required to be paid.
One way risk can measured at banks is through capital ratios. One common ratio used by
regulators is called the capital adequacy ratio. This is determined by taking total capital and dividing it
into risk weighted assets (Capital/RWA). Risk weighted assets are when a bank’s assets are given certain
weights based on the perceived riskiness of the asset. This means that the riskier assets carry a higher
weight and cause the total amount of RWA to increase.7 When this ratio is low, the bank has more riskweighted assets compared to capital. This means the bank may not be able to sufficiently cover itself if
customers begin to fail on their loans (the safety net is not large enough).
On occasions, capital ratios start to decline at banks. One way capital ratios decline is when
earnings are impaired by large losses from high-risk and often high-yield loans or securities; the result is
especially damaging when a portfolio is concentrated in the asset group experiencing exceptionally high
slow, nonaccrual, restructured or loss status8. This means that the bank attempts to grow by lending out
more money to possibly risky customers. When this happens, assets increase while capital stays the
same. The bank now may be unable to support itself if some adverse event were to happen because it
may not have enough capital to cover these risky loans that might not be paid back. Many institutions
experiencing capital problems respond by shrinking their balance sheet to reduce the asset base more
quickly than capital is dissipated by losses to shore up fragile capital ratios9. Banks may sell assets to get
capital ratios back up causing them to generate less profit. When it’s obvious a bank is selling assets to
improve capital ratios, credit agencies take notice and will downgrade the bank, making it harder, and
more expensive, for the bank to receive a loan. Overall, when capital ratios decline, or are low to begin
with, the bank is considered risky.
Capital, as described above, plays an important role at a bank. It’s important to describe the
different types of capital. The first is called Tier 1 capital and it includes qualifying common stock and
related surplus of net treasury stock and retained earnings. Tier 1 capital is widely recognized as the
most loss absorbing form of capital, as it is permanent and places shareholders’ funds at risk of loss in
the event of insolvency. The second type of capital is called Tier 2 capital and it includes the allowance
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for loan and lease loss up to 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets, qualifying preferred stock, and
subordinated debt. The third is total capital, and that is the sum of tier 1 and tier 2 capital.10
This paper will look at several capital ratios. The first is called the tier 1 leverage ratio and it is
measured by dividing Tier 1 capital into a banks average total consolidated assets (Tier1/AvgAssets). The
second ratio I this paper will look at is the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio. It is measured by dividing a
bank’s Tier 1 capital into its risk-weighted assets (Tier 1/RWA). The third ratio used will be the total riskbased capital ratio. It is measured by dividing a bank’s total capital into risk weighted assets (Total
Capital/RWA).11
In 2013, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the OCC published Basel III which legally established
minimum capital ratios for banks. Basel III states ratios of Tier 1 capital to RWA of 6%, Total capital to
total RWA of 8%, and Tier 1 to average total assets of 4%.12 The purpose of Basel III was to set capital
ratios high with the goal of preventing a future recession. Capital ratios were low during the recession of
2008, but with the help of Basel III ratios will be held high to hopefully prevent banks from going out of
business during an adverse event in the future.
This paper seeks to establish a relationship between executive compensation and capital ratios
and this relationship is as follows: the higher percentage incentive-based pay the CEO is
compensated with, the lower the capital ratios. The more a CEO is paid in cash-based
compensation, the less risky a bank will be in terms of capital, meaning their ratios will be higher. The
goal of this paper will be to prove this hypothesis in the hopes of helping future regulators establish laws
on the amount of incentive-based compensation an executive can receive, to avoid banks from
becoming too risky in terms of their capital. The following section discuses studies, which have been
done in the past that also sought to establish a relationship between executive compensation and the
perceived riskiness of a bank.

2.) RELATION TO EXISTING LITERATURE
There have been previous studies completed on the relationship between CEO compensation
and perceived bank riskiness. A study done in 2001, by Hermalin and Wallace, looked at agency theory, a
theory that predicts that a managers’ compensation should be positively correlated with his firm
performance.13 Simply stated, a CEO should be paid more when the firm he/she is managing performs
better. The study attempted to incorporate base salary and bank risk. Bank risk was measured by beta,
which compares a bank’s stock return to the total economy. A bank with a beta of 1 has stock that
moves directly in line with the economy. A lower beta indicates less movement in stock returns and may
indicate a lower risk bank. A higher beta indicates a stock price that is volatile and may indicate higher
risk. The study found evidence consistent with the agency theory and concluded by stating that
managerial compensation increases with firm risk to compensate managers for bearing that risk. This
study implied that bank CEOs are paid more when they manage a risky bank to compensate them for
effectively managing a lot of risk. Other studies broke down executive compensation to try and connect
10
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aspects of executive compensation to bank risk, rather than connecting executive compensation to the
agency theory.
Palia and Porter (2004) studied managerial incentive compensation and capital requirements
and the effect these two variables have on bank charter value and bank risk. Charter value arises out of
the value created when a bank obtains the ability to operate in a regulated environment. The two
measured charter value by using the variable Tobin’s Q. This variable measures the bank’s future profitgenerating potential arising from such things as efficiency, market power, and customer relationships.
To state it simply, Tobin’s Q exemplifies how well a bank is managed and the future profit the bank can
establish based on how well it is being managed. The two measured capital by using a risk-based capital
ratio and a book-value capital ratio. Executive compensation was looked at in terms of salary and
bonuses (cash-based compensation) versus the value of stock held by managers (incentive-based
compensation). Bank risk was measured by observing the standard deviation of total return on a bank’s
stock. The larger the standard deviation, the more the stock price changes/is volatile, and the higher the
bank’s perceived risk.
The two were able to establish some relationships based on the variables described above. In a
regression with the bank book-value capital ratio while controlling for bank size we find the value of
options to be significant at the 10% level. The sign of the coefficient is positive implying higher levels of
options result in a higher charter value is the first discovery made. This means that the team found a
relationship that shows bank charter values increase as executives are compensated with more stock
options. The second discovery that is made is increased capital levels decrease risk when risk is
measured by the standard deviation of total return. This relationship exemplifies that the more capital
the bank has on its balance sheet, the lower the risk at a bank. The final discovery was that increases in
CEO stock holdings produce increases in risk. This relationship exemplifies that the more stock a CEO
owns in a bank, the riskier the bank, when risk is measured by the standard deviation of returns.14
A study done by Fortin, Goldberg, and Roth (2006) was able to establish a similar relationship
that Palia and Porter established in 2004. The three used a sample of 83 of the largest bank-holding
companies in the US. They wanted to compare whether bank-specific characteristics in place in 2005 are
related to bank risk-taking in 2006. The study looked at how executives were compensated in 2005.
Compensation was broken down by base salary, market value of stock ownership, and any bonuses. The
goal was to connect these variables to bank risk in 2006, measured by the standard deviation of daily
share returns. Researchers participating in the study believed that options-based executive
compensation is expected to increase managerial incentives to take risk because volatility in the
underlying share price increases its value. The researchers believed if managers were given more shares
of stock, they would take more risk to make the stock more volatile. A stock being volatile means that
the price of the stock changes a lot, and this increases the value of the stock. The study concluded by
making the statement that bank CEOs who are paid higher base salaries take less risk and in contrast,
bank CEOs who are paid more in bonuses or in stock options take more risk.15
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The results of these studies align with similar results found in an earlier study done by Kose,
Saunders and Senbet (2000). The team studied the effects of an FDIC insurance premium scheme that
assessed and placed banks into categories based on their capital. Categories ranged from wellcapitalized to capitalized to under-capitalized. The goal of the study was to prove that incentive features
of top-management compensation should be included in the FDIC insurance premium scheme. The
study measured top executive compensation and was able to successfully connect it to bank risk,
measured by the standard deviation of stock returns. They also concluded that bank risk decreases as
managers’ salary and bonuses increase.16
A paper published by Guo, Jalal, and Khaksari (2014) expanded upon the findings of the previous
studies. In their paper they examined 3 relationships; (1) how the composition of executive
compensation is related to a bank’s incentive to take risk, (2) whether executive compensation in larger
banks, especially too-big-to-fail banks (TBTF), induces more severe moral hazard behavior, and (3) how
the relation between executive compensation and risk taking changes before and during the recent
financial crisis.
The team expanded on bank risk measures to paint a larger, more complete picture of risk at
banks. They measured risk using the standard deviation of the bank’s stock returns and the standard
deviation of the return on assets as an alternative measure of bank risk. The higher these standard
deviations, the more volatile and risky the bank becomes. The trio also used the Z-score as a measure of
bank risk. The Z-score measures the distance from bank insolvency, insolvency meaning the bank’s
inability to pay back its debt and cover its deposits. The lower the Z-score, the closer a bank is to
insolvency. The team also looked at problem institutions to classify a risky bank. They classified a bank
as a problem institution if its problem loans to equity ratio is over the 85th percentile of all US banks on
an annual basis. This would show if a bank is having trouble with customers defaulting on loans and if
the bank does not have a large enough capital base to cover these problem loans. In addition, the team
also looked at banks with a CAMEL rating of 3, 4, or 5. A bank with a CAMEL rating of 3, 4, or 5 is viewed
as a problem bank by regulators. A bank that is classified as a problem institution is considered a risky
institution.
The team tested several variables that could possibly have an effect of bank riskiness. One of
these variables was executive compensation, which they broke down between salary, bonuses, and
long-term incentives (i.e. shares of stock). Another variable used was Tobin’s Q which is estimated by
the bank’s market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities, divided by the book value of assets.
They used the variable as a proxy for a bank’s growth opportunities to try and peg a relationship
between growth opportunities and riskiness at a bank. A third variable tested against risk was too big to
fail (TBTF) institutions, which is classified by if the institution is one of the ten largest bank-holding
companies by size in a particular year. The team tested this variable because it is reasonable to assume
that these largest institutions are more likely to be bailed out by the US given their failure’s potential
impact on systematic risk. If a bank is more likely to be bailed out, it may have greater incentive to take
more risk. The final variable tested against risk was gindex which is a measure of the quality of corporate
governance. The score ranges from 1 to 24 and higher gindex is associated with less shareholder rights
and greater power of management. If a bank has a low gindex score, meaning more shareholder rights,
16
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it may be considered as risky. Given more rights, shareholders may manage the bank to make their stock
price more volatile and thus more valuable, but a volatile stock price shows an increase in bank risk.
The paper ended with a few conclusions. First, they found that bank risk measured by the Zscore and volatility of stock returns increases with incentive compensation. This conclusion is in line
with the previous papers’ conclusions that greater stock-based pay increases bank risk, when measured
by the standard deviation of stock returns. This conclusion adds to the previous papers by also
connecting stock-based compensation with the Z-score at a bank, which measures the distance from
insolvency. Another conclusion made was that greater proportion of incentive pay is positively related
to banks’ valuation and performance. This result is similar to a third finding in the paper that states,
“greater proportion of incentive pay does not increase the likelihood for a bank to become a problem or
failed institution.” These findings create a relationship that greater incentive pay for executives may
help bank performance, and also do not necessarily cause the bank to become a problem institution.
Although the first finding shows that incentive pay increases bank risk, these findings show that
incentive pay doesn’t necessarily mean the bank will become a problem institution. (It is important to
note that bank riskiness and problem institution were measured using different variables).
The last two conclusions were about TBTF institutions. The team found that TBTF banks
experience greater risk taking (lower Z-score) and are more likely to be in financial distress than smaller
banks. This conclusion is in line with the hypothesis that TBTF banks may take more risks because they
are more likely to be bailed out by the government. The team also found that greater incentive
compensation in TBTF banks helps reduce their insolvency risk relative to smaller institutions. This
conclusion is interesting in that smaller banks, paying their executives with more incentive
compensation, may take more risks than larger banks with a similar compensation structure.17
A study published Handorf (2013) also expanded on bank risk. The goal was to understand if
new compensation practices, established by banks after the financial crisis in 2008, helped to mitigate
risk. Handorf posed the question; does compensation practice after new rules have been instituted
reward safe and sound operations or encourage risk-taking? New rules are those rules established by
the Dodd-Frank Act, a congressional act put into place after the financial crisis in 2008. The Dodd-Frank
Act had a goal of preventing banks performing activities that helped cause the crisis in 2008.18
Handorf looked at capital risk in banks before, during, and after the crisis. He did this by looking
at two variables: the Tier 1 capital ratio, and a variable that compared bank’s problem assets against its
capital plus its allowance for loan and lease losses (problem assets ratio). He looked at capital risk to
understand if banks were abiding by new rules established in Dodd-Frank that raised capital
requirements. Handorf states within a range, regulators prefer more capital, whereas bankers prefer
less capital. Higher capital makes it harder on bankers to leverage return on assets to return on equity so
important value creation can be made in the stock market. Handorf tested the tier 1 capital ratio by
stating if a compensation committee or board of director’s wishes to reward prudent risk management
to lessen the probability of failure or supervisory merger, we should observe a positive correlation
between adjusted compensation and levels of tier 1 leverage capital. That is, better capitalized banks
should more highly reward their CEO. Handorf found a positive correlation coefficient that implied that
17
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better capitalized banks were more highly rewarding their CEO. Handorf also tested the problem assets
ratio by stating if prudent lending and attention to capital and the allowance for loan loss is rewarded,
there should be a negative relationship between the ratio of a bank’s problematic assets and capital.
That is, banks with more capital and fewer problem loans should be more highly compensated. Handorf
found a negative correlation proving that executives were better compensated when there was more
attention to capital and the allowance for loan and lease losses.
Handorf also tested asset risk at banks. The first way he did this was by looking at asset yield. He
believed that banks with high-yield assets presumably have originated or purchased high-risk credits or
invested in high risk securities more susceptible to loss meaning that a higher asset yield may indicate
loans that may default. He tested asset yield by stating if the board is now rewarding prudent lending
and investment strategy, rather than short-term profits and risk-taking, we should observe a negative
correlation between asset yield and adjusted compensation. That is, banks posting lesser interest
income should better compensate their CEOs. He found a negative correlation indicating that banks with
a lower asset yield, meaning less risky assets, compensate their CEO better. Handorf also tested asset
risk by looking at the provision at banks. The provision is part of the balance sheet and is used to
increase the allowance for loan and lease losses. A higher provision indicates the bank needs to increase
its allowance for loan and lease losses to cover for risky and possible default loans. Handorf tested the
provision by stating if a board of directors rewards a careful program of lending, we should see a
negative relationship between the provision metric and adjusted compensation. That is, banks incurring
lesser provisions should compensate CEOs better. He found a negative correlation indicating banks with
lower provisions are compensating their executives better. The final way Handorf viewed asset risk was
by looking at net loan loss. The net loan loss ratio shows assets that have been charged off (removed
from the balance sheet) versus loans that have been recovered from being written/charged-off early.
Handorf tests the net loan loss ratio by stating, if a board of directors has elected to reward safe and
sound lending, we should observe a negative relationship between the net loss ratio and adjusted
compensation. That is, banks incurring fewer net losses should more highly compensate their executive
management. Handorf found a negative correlation indicating that executives were better compensated
for keeping the net loan loss ratio low.
The final risk Handorf looked at was liquidity risk. The first variable he used, as an indicator of
liquidity risk, was the net non-core funding ratio. This ratio is defined as non-core funds less short-term
securities all divided by long-term assets. Non-core funds include uninsured deposits, brokered deposits
and other sources of funds that may not easily be renewed or are subject to disintermediation. From a
liquidity risk perspective, the higher the net non-core funding ratio, the higher the risk. Unfortunately,
Handorf was unable to find a correlation coefficient significant enough to make a conclusion about this
ratio and executive compensation. The second variable Handorf measured was net loans and leases
ratio, which is taken by comparing net loans and leases to assets. Loans are viewed as being harder to
convert to cash than other assets, meaning a higher ratio of loans to assets will increase liquidity risk.
Handorf was also unable to find a correlation coefficient significant enough to connect compensation to
this ratio. The final variable Handorf looked at to measure liquidity risk is the financial strength rating.
This rating reflects, the probability a bank may require financial assistance from their holding company,
shareholders or the government. Banks needing funding from these sources may be experiencing some
liquidity risk. Handorf tests this variable by stating if the financial strength metric truly reflects potential
liquidity exposure and is used by a board of directors when crafting compensation programs, the
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relationship should prove negative. That is, banks perceived to have a higher probability of requiring
financial assistance should pay CEOs less. He found a negative correlation meaning that CEOs are being
paid less if there is a perceived higher probability of financial assistance.19
Handorf’s study was able to make several conclusions about CEO compensation and capital,
asset, and liquidity risk at banks. Unfortunately, his study did not test different parts of total CEO
compensation on these different risk measures, but rather tested more versus less total compensation.
Other studies, discussed above, broke down CEO compensation to connect it to bank risk by separating
base salary, bonuses, and stock-based compensation. Many of these papers measured bank risk
primarily by looking at the standard deviation of stock returns.
This study will be different from the ones described above for a few reasons. First, it will break
down CEO compensation unlike Handorf’s paper. Also, instead of looking at the standard deviation of
stock returns as a measure of risk, this paper will strictly focus on capital ratios as a measure of bank
risk. It will then proceed to connect certain aspects of executive compensation to capital ratios to make
a discovery about parts of compensation and capital risk at banks. The proceeding section will discuss
tests and the results of these tests and will be followed by a conclusion about these results.

3.) DATA AND SAMPLE
For my sample, I found the fifty largest banks in the US, by asset size, on the FFIEC’s website.
The FFIEC (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council) is a government agency that prescribes
uniform principles, standards, and report forms for federal examination, according to their website. The
FFIEC aids in the examination of banks by regulators by providing banks with the same forms and
standards across the country.20 Banks were then narrowed down to only publicly traded banks. Nonpublicly traded banks do not have to provide financial information to the public. Forty three banks
remained after non-publicly traded banks were eliminated. Call reports for each of the forty three banks
were downloaded in order to get capital ratios for each bank. A call report is a form that banks across
the US fill out every quarter so that regulators can monitor the condition and the performance of the
bank. Call reports contain important financial information on the bank, but for the purposes of this
paper, only certain capital ratios were collected from the call reports.
Data on bank CEO compensation was collected from the Execucomp database for the year 2012.
Execucomp is a database that includes information on executive compensation for S&P 1000 firms
starting in 1992. Executive compensation data in Execucomp includes base salary, bonus, and stock
option information. In addition, the database also provides company financial data starting in 1992.
Executive compensation was broken down and defined by three main variables. The first variable used
was SALARY, which measures the dollar value of an executive’s base salary during the fiscal year. The
second variable used was BONUS, which is the bonus earned by that executive in the given fiscal year.
OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL measures the market value of in-the-money stock options at fiscal yearend.
It is found by calculating the difference between the exercise price of the options and the close price of
the company’s primary issue of stock at year end. The fourth variable used was SHROWN_TOT, which
measures the shares owned by an executive. SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS_PCT measures the percentage of
19
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total shares owned by the executive excluding options. Also, EQUITY_PCT was a variable used to
calculate the percentage of compensation that was equity based for a given fiscal year. It was calculated
by adding salary and bonus for a CEO, dividing that by total compensation, and then subtracting the
result from one (1-((bonus+salary)/total compensation). Finally, the variable TDC1 was used to measure
the total compensation of an executive for a given year. This variable takes into account the sum of
salary, bonus, and equity based compensation. In addition, the age of the CEO was used as a variable,
and is listed as AGE. For the purposes of this paper, salary and bonus will be considered cash based
compensation, whereas variables measuring equity based compensation will be considered incentive
based compensation. Compensation variables will be tested against capital ratios and other financial
ratios in an attempt to test a relationship between variables.
Capital ratios were collected for the year 2013. A one year difference between executive
compensation data and capital ratio data ensured that there was enough time for executive
compensation to possibly cause a change in capital ratios. There are three main variables used for
capital ratios. The first variable was TIER1_LEV_RATIO which is the tier 1 leverage ratio. It is calculated
by dividing tier 1 capital into a banks’ total average assets (Tier 1/AvgAssets). This variable provides a
dollar amount of tier 1 capital compared to a dollar amount of average assets. For example, a tier 1
leverage ratio of .5 can be read as “for every 1 dollar of average assets, the bank has $.5 in tier 1
capital.” The second variable used was TIER1_RBC_RATIO which is the tier 1 risk-based capital ratio
taken by dividing tier 1 capital into risk-weighted assets (Tier 1/RWA). This measure shows a dollar
amount of tier 1 capital compared to a dollar amount of risk-weighted assets. The final variable used
was TOTAL_RBC which is the total risk-based capital ratio. It is calculated by dividing total risk-based
capital into total risk-weighted assets (Total RBC/RWA). It is read as a dollar amount of risk-weighted
capital compared to a dollar amount of risk-weighted assets. Together, these three variables provide
capital measures for a bank and are determinants of capital risk at a bank.
In addition, variables that capture basic financial information about a bank were used. COMMEQ
is a variable that measures the common equity at a bank. It is calculated by adding Common Stock,
Capital Surplus, Retained Earnings, and Treasury Stock adjustments. ROEAVG measures the return on
average equity. It calculated by dividing net income by the average of the most current year’s Total
Common Equity. It provides a measurement of how well a bank is creating a return for its stock holders.
A higher return on average equity means the bank is doing a good job creating a return for investors
compared to a lower return on average equity. ASSETS measures the total assets reported by the bank
for a given year. ROA measures the return on assets and is calculated by diving net income by reported
assets. It provides a value for how well a bank is generating an income on its assets. For example, an
ROA of .9 indicates a bank is generating 90 cents in income for every dollar of assets. TRS1YR measures
the total one year return to the shareholders for the given fiscal year. A higher TRS1YR indicates a bank
is generating more of a return for its shareholders.
For this paper, capital ratios are the dependent variables with the goal of establishing a
relationship with executive compensation structure. In addition, basic financial information variables will
be used as control variables during regression analysis. The hypothesis of this paper is that incentivebased compensation will decrease capital ratios which will in turn increase capital risk at banks. Higher
salary and bonus variables, as a proportion of total compensation, should be a positively related to the
capital ratios. A statistically significant positive relationship would indicate that a higher cash-based
compensation program increases capital ratios which will in turn decrease capital risk. Alternatively,
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equity-based variables, as a proportion of total compensation, should have a negative relationship with
capital ratio variables. This would indicate that the higher equity based salary and executive is
compensated with, the lower the capital ratios indicating higher capital risk.

4.) METHODOLOGY
To begin regression analysis, descriptive statistics were used to provide the mean, median, and
standard deviation of variables. In addition, the minimum and maximum, as well as the number of
observations for each variable, are shown. To start with compensation data, the average total
compensation of CEOs in the 43 largest publicly traded banks in America is about $6.7 million with a
standard deviation of $5.2 million. These statistics show that total executive compensation has a wide
range among executives in our sample. In addition, the average age of executives in the sample is just
over 56 years.
The average base salary of executives in 2012 is about $970,000 and the average bonus is about
$491,000. The market value of shares owned by an executive averages about $1.08 million. Equity
owned as a percentage of total compensation averages about 72%. In addition, executives in our sample
average about .41% of total shares outstanding of their given bank. Based on descriptive statistics,
executives in the sample are being compensated more with equity based forms of compensation and
less with cash-based forms of compensation.
Common equity outstanding is averaging about $26.5 billion for banks in our sample. It should
be noted that the standard deviation of common equity outstanding is about $54.2 billion. This large
standard deviation implies that the range of common equity is large, with some banks having over one
billion dollars outstanding of common equity. On average, banks in the sample are generating a return
for their shareholders. The average return on average equity is about 9.4% and the average total return
for shareholders is about 26%. Average asset size of the banks in the sample, is about $27.5 billion with
a standard deviation of $58 billion. The standard deviation indicates that the asset size of the bigger
banks in the sample is much larger than that of the smaller banks in the sample. Banks in the sample are
generating a return on assets. On average, banks are generating $.90 for every dollar of assets.
Capital ratios for banks in the sample meet Basel III standards. Basel III states that the tier 1
leverage ratio must be 4% at a minimum. The average Tier 1 leverage ratio for the sample is about 9.2%,
with the lowest ratio, at about 5.3%, still meeting standards. Basel also states that the Tier 1 risk-basedcapital ratio must be 6%. The average Tier 1 RBC ratio for the sample is 12.2% with the lowest ratio at
7.5% still meeting standards. In addition, Basel also states that the total RBC ratio must be at least 8%.
The average total RBC ratio is 13.8% with the lowest ratio, at 10.3%, still meeting standards.
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Table 1 Variable Description
Variable Name
TDC1
OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL
AGE
SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS_PCTSHROWN_TOT
SHROWN_TOT
SALARY
BONUS
EQUITY_PCT
COMMEQ
ROEAVG
ASSETS
ROA
TRS1YR
CO_PER_ROL
TIER1_LEV_RATIO
TIER1_RBC_RATIO
TOTAL_RBC
LOG_ASSETS
LOG_AGE
LOG_TDC1
*Descriptions from Execucomp database
Table 2

Description
Total Compensation (Salary + Bonus + Other Annual + Restricted Stock
Grants + LTIP Payouts + All Other + Value of Option Grants) ($000)
Estimated Value of In-the-Money Unexercised Exercisable Options ($000)
Executive’s Age
Percentage of Total Shares Owned – Options Excluded
Value of shares owned by the executive ($000)
The dollar value of the base salary earned by executive for given fiscal
year ($000)
The dollar value of a bonus earned by executive for given fiscal year
($000)
Equity as percentage of total compensation
The sum of Common Stock, Capital Surplus, Retained Earnings, and
Treasury Stock adjustments ($000,000)
Return on Average Equity
The Total Assets as reported by the company ($000,000)
Return on Assets
1 Yr. Total Return to Shareholders
ID number for each executive/company combination
Tier 1 leverage ratio
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio
Total risk-based capital ratio
The natural logarithm of assets
The natural logarithm of age
The natural logarithm of total compensation

Summary Statistics

Variable

N

TDC1
OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL
AGE
SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS_PCTSHROWN_TOT
SHROWN_TOT
SALARY
BONUS
COMMEQ
ROEAVG
ASSETS
ROA
TRS1YR
CO_PER_ROL
EQUITY_PCT
TIER1_LEV_RATIO
TIER1_RBC_RATIO
TOTAL_RBC

43
43
43
41
41
43
43
43
43
43
43
43
43
43
42
42
42

Mean

Median

Std Dev Minimum

6699.12 4846.07
5212.64
3548.83
112.40 10877.29
56.70
55.00
7.30
0.41
0.12
0.58
1079.89
713.63
1398.73
970.81
900.00
529.29
491.48
0.00
1360.09
26579.03 3268.94 54230.09
9.45
10.00
7.26
274896.77 30324.40 581764.84
0.91
0.92
0.73
26.12
19.87
25.05
29352.44 30401.00 12243.73
0.72
0.76
0.19
0.09
0.09
0.02
0.12
0.12
0.02
0.14
0.14
0.17

Maximum

1375.00
22602.00
0.00
50824.00
39.00
77.00
0.01
2.74
41.32
7657.00
0.00
2800.00
0.00
5700.00
589.12 218188.00
-12.60
34.35
5464.00 2359141.00
-1.35
3.11
-16.02
109.78
5861.00
46862.00
0.26
0.99
0.05
0.17
0.08
0.16
0.10
0.19
14

15

.21674
.1627
-.02672
.8683
.10611
.5091
-.14578
.3509
.05871
.7084
.07101
.6509
.11422
.4658
.04711
.7642
.10308
.5107
-.03021
.8475
.23910
.1225
-.03900
.8063
.03282
.8365
-.02401
.8800

SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS -.32049
_PCTSHROWN_TOT
.0411
0.51286
SHROWN_TOT
.0006
.18415
SALARY
.2372
.45117
BONUS
.0024
.72453
COMMEQ
<.0001
-.05608
ROEAVG
.7210
.71568
ASSETS
<.0001
-.05111
ROA
.7448
.34453
TRS1YR
.0237
.42419
EQUITY_PCT
.0046
-.00154
TIER1_LEV_RATIO
.9923
.14311
TIER1_RBC_RATIO
.3659
.23500
TOTAL_RBC
.1341

1

.43743
.0043
.25492
.1077
.26482
.0861
-.00062
.9969
.01937
.9019
-.04221
.7881
.01612
.9183
-.02038
8968
-.02822
.8574
-.13231
.3977
.02133
.8933
-.21797
.1655
-.18196
.2488

1

.23243
.1436
.17677
.2689
-.10486
.5141
-.24658
.1201
-.06004
.7092
-.23470
.1397
-.00653
.9677
-.12912
.4211
-.42631
.0054
.04000
.8064
.05396
.7409
.00864
.9578

1

.27978
.0765
.35628
.0222
.62091
<.0001
-.07717
.6315
.67379
<.0001
-.07018
.6628
.35014
.0248
-.05675
.7245
.11026
.4982
.02083
.8985
.05104
.7545

1

.00526
.9733
.23952
.1219
-.09366
.5503
.26516
.0857
-.16400
.2933
.01789
.9093
-.33971
.0258
.12471
.4313
-.15786
.3181
-.12454
.4320

1

.61706
<.0001
-.17940
.2497
.60790
<.0001
-.20432
.1888
.47109
.0014
-.27069
.0791
.40172
.0084
.19331
.2200
.11267
.4774

1

.15612
3235
.14957
.3445

1

.90472
<.0001

1
1

TRS1YR EQUITY_ TIER1_LEV_ TIER1_RBC_ TOTAL_
PCT
RATIO
RATIO
RBC

-.09714
1
.5355
.99336 -.08427
<.0001 .5911
1
-.11348 .94791 -.11023
.4687 <.0001 .4816
1
.46772 .22419 .45069 .21923
.0016
.1484 .0024 .1578
1
.06683 .07913 .05679 .13859 -.07471
1
.6703
.6140 .7176 .3754 .6340
-.00806 .02786 .01166 .07524 .34900 -.19267
.9596
.8610 .9416 .6358 .0235 .2215
.01579 -.04273 .02935 -.04323 .05568 .10470
.9209
.7882 .8536 .7858 .7262 .5093
.09764 -.06516 .10111 -.05929 .15063 .24482
.5384
.6818 .5240 .7092 .3410 .1181

1

Correlation Coefficient
P-Value
SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS SHROWN_TOT SALARY BONUS COMMEQ ROEAVG ASSETS ROA
_PCTSHROWN_TOT

Table can be read as follows:

OPT_UNEX_EX AGE
ER_EST_VAL

TDC1
1
OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST 0.38842
_VAL
.0101
0.04836
AGE
.7581

TDC1

Table 3 Correlation Matrix

Descriptive statistics give a general overview of how executives in the sample are being
compensated, how large these banks are, and how well capital ratios are being met. From the statistics,
on average executives are being paid more with equity based incentive compensation rather than being
paid with cash based forms of compensation. But, capital ratios are still meeting Basel III minimums, and
on average are much higher than Basel III minimums. On average, returns on assets and returns for
shareholders are also being seen. With this all taken into account, executives in the sample are keeping
capital risk low by maintaining high capital ratios while still generating a return on assets and for
shareholders.
Following an analysis of descriptive statistics, a correlation test was run for variables used during
regression analysis. Tests were run to ensure that no two variables, with strong correlation coefficients,
were the same measures. No two variables had strong enough correlation to conclude that they were
the same measures. Correlation tests for all variables can be seen in Table 3.
In addition, the natural logarithm of certain variables was added to the list of variables. The
natural log of assets, age, and total compensation were calculated based off of the sample. The natural
logarithm of these three variables was taken because these variables are typically not normally
distributed. The logarithm ensured a more even distribution of the data for these variables. This would
remove any outliers and allow for better results during regression analysis.
Following the univariate correlation test, multiple regression analysis was run using different
models. In each model, different variables were tested against the three capital ratios. The first
regression test used variables EQUITY_PCT, ROA, ROE_AVG, LOG_ASSETS, TRS1YR, LOG_TDC1, and
LOG_AGE. The second regression test run used the same variables but removed ROE_AVG. this variable
was thought to possibly be a similar measure to TRS1YR, because both variables are measuring return
on equity. The final regression analysis run used the same variables as the second test, but removed
LOG_AGE and LOG_TDC1. These variables were removed because they measure attributes of the
executive and may not be confounding variables on capital ratios. This allowed for a more concise test
between executive compensation and capital ratios. In addition, if for some reason any banks had no
data recorded for variables being tested, these banks were removed from the sample. Only one bank
was missing data for some variables, causing the sample size to decrease to forty-two.

5.) REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 4 provides results from the first set of regression analysis. When looking at results, Pvalues between the majority of independent variables and capital ratios are above ten percent. This
means that the null hypothesis is accepted for these results. There is no statistical relationship between
the majority independent variables and capital ratios. Most notably, the results of equity percentage
and capital ratios have high p-values indicating no statistically significant relationship. This finding is
inconsistent with findings in previous literature where equity-based compensation had a significant
negative relationship with bank risk. Bank risk, in this paper, is viewed as capital ratios at banks. The
hypothesis was there should be a negative relationship between equity percentage and capital ratios.
This would indicate that a higher equity percentage of capital ratios provides a lower capital ratio, which
would show a higher capital risk. For the tier 1 leverage ratio and the tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, there
is a negative relationship with equity percentage. But the P-values in the results are too high to conclude
a relationship that is statistically significant enough.
16

One result in Table 4 is significant enough to make a conclusion with 90% confidence. The
relationship between total 1 year stock return and the tier 1 leverage ratio has a positive relationship
and has a P-value equal to .09 which allows a rejection of the null hypothesis. Based on the sample, with
90% confidence a conclusion can be made that the higher the tier 1 leverage ratio, the higher 1 year
stock return to shareholders. This positive relationship bodes well for banks and for regulators as banks
are able to generate a return for stockholders and are also able to keep capital ratios high lowering
capital risk.
Table 4

Determinants of Capital Ratios
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Dep Variable TIER_1_LEV_RATIO TIER_1_RBC_RATIO TOTAL_RBC
.0392
.1781
.1674
Intercept
(.1027)
(.0988)
(.0926)
[.7050]
[.0802]
[.0794]
-.0378
-.0138
.0090
EQUITY_PCT
(.0238)
(.0229)
(.0214)
[.1208]
[.5493]
[.6769]
.0197
-.0010
-.0026
ROA
(.0150)
(.0144)
(.0135)
[.1978]
[.9467]
[.8518]
-.0017
.0001
.0001
ROEAVG
(.0014)
(.0013)
(.0013)
[.2418]
[.9463]
[.9785]
-.0045
-.0046
-.0019
LOG_ASSETS
(.0041)
(.0039)
(.0037)
[.2742]
[.2484]
[.6136]
TRS1YR

.0002
(.0001)
[.0948]

.0001
(.0001)
[.9073]

.0001
(.0001)
[.4803]

LOG_TDC1

.0127
(.0107)
[.2454]

.0147
(.0103)
[.1636]

.0078
(.0097)
[.4274]

LOG_AGE

.0030
(.0241)
[.9017]

-.0300
(.0232)
[.2045]

-.0203
(.0217)
[.3571]

42
-0.0778
.58
[.7695]

42
-0.0369
.79
[.5992]

Observations
R-squared
F-stat
[P-value]

42
0.0579
1.36
[.2536]
Parameter estimate

Results can be read as follows: (Standard error)
[P-value]
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Table 5

Determinants of Capital Ratios
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Dep Variable TIER_1_LEV_RATIO TIER1_RBC_RATIO TOTAL_RBC
.0361
.1783
.1675
Intercept
(.1033)
(.0973)
(.0912)
[.7286]
[.0755]
[.0749]
-.0343
-.0140
.0089
(.0237)
(.0224)
(.0209)
EQUITY_PCT
[.1573]
[.5346]
[.6725]
ROA

.0029
(.0052)
[.5764]

-.0001
(.0049)
[.9915]

-.0022
(.0046)
[.6336]

LOG_ASSETS

-.0048
(.0041)
[.2502]

-.0046
(.0039)
[.2423]

-.0019
(.0036)
[.6088]

TRS1YR

.00025
(.0001)
[.0937]

.0001
(.0001)
[.9066]

.0001
(.0001)
[.4740]

LOG_TDC1

.0128
(.0108)
[.2431]

.0147
(.0102)
[.1577]

.0078
(.0095)
[.4207]

LOG_AGE

.0035
(.0242)
[.8859]

-.0300
(.0228)
[.1974]

-.0203
(.0214)
[.3497]

Observations

42

42

42

R-squared
F-stat
[P-value]

0.0467
1.33
[.2683]

-0.0472
.69
[.6574]

-0.0073
.95
[.4721]

*The tables above can be read as
follows. The capital ratios are always
the dependent variable and are
listed at the top, each having its own
column. The independent variables
are listed on the side each having its
own row. In each box is the results
for that specific independent and
dependent variable. The first
number listed is the parameter
estimate for those two variables. It
represents the values for the
regression equation
(Ypredicted=mx+b) for predicting
the dependent variable from the
independent variable. The second
number in () is the standard error. It
measures a test for whether or not
the result is significantly different
from zero. The third number is the
P-value, and is the most important
result from the table. This value
tests the null hypothesis (in this case
the null hypothesis is that there is
no relationship) and if it can be
accepted or rejected. Ideally, this
value should be as low as possible
which would allow the rejection of
the null hypothesis. The number of
observations is provided at the
bottom. R-squared is provided as
well. This variable measures the
proportion of variance in the
dependent variable which can be
predicted from the independent
variable. The P-value is associated
with the F-value, and the hope is
that the P-value is very small. The
smaller the P-value, the more
significant the relationship is
between the independent variables
and the dependent variable.
(Descriptions provided by SAS
website)
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Table 6 Determinants of Capital Ratios
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Dep Variable TIER1_LEV_RATIO TIER_1_RBC_RATIO TOTAL_RBC
.1014
.1167
.1172
Intercept
(.0222)
(.0215)
(.0196)
[<.0001]
[<.0001]
[<.0001]
-.0154
.0114
.0229
EQUITY_PCT
(.0166)
(.0161)
(.0146)
[.3601]
[.4812]
[.1268]
.0006
-.0020
-.0032
ROA
(.0048)
(.0046)
(.0042)
[.9021]
[.6605]
[.4577]
-.0006
-.0002
.0004
LOG_ASSETS
(.0022)
(.0021)
(.0019)
[.7865]
[.9234]
[.8352]
.0003
.0001
.0001
TRS1YR
(.0001)
(.0001)
(.0001)
[.0587]
[.6484]
[.3438]
Observations

42

42

42

R-squared
0.0594
-0.0856
0.0097
F-stat
1.65
.19
1.10
[P-value]
[.1830]
[.9410]
[.3709]
Table 5 provides results from the second set of regression analysis. As stated above, these
results have the independent variable ROEAVG removed. Similar to Table 4, the results in Table 5 shows
that where the majority of independent variable P-values are high. This indicates that there is no P-value
statistically significant enough to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between
variables. The tier 1 leverage ratio and tier 1 risk-based capital ratio are indicating a negative
relationship, but are not significant enough to make a conclusion. Total 1 year stock returns has the
lowest P-value and a positive relationship to the tier 1 leverage ratio. With 90% confidence, the null
hypothesis can be rejected, and the conclusion can be made that there is a positive relationship
between 1 year stock returns and the tier 1 leverage ratio.
Table 6 provides results from the final regression analysis. This regression analysis removed the
variables LOG_AGE and LOG_TDC1 as these are CEO-specific variables. Similar to the previous results,
the p-values remain high indicating that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The relationship
between equity percentage and the tier 1 leverage ratio remains negative, but is positive for the tier 1
risk-based capital ratio and the total risk-based capital ratio. But the three P-values are too high to make
a conclusion that rejects the null hypothesis. The lowest P-value is the relationship between total 1 year
stock returns and the tier 1 leverage ratio. With about 94% confidence, the null hypothesis can be
rejected, and a positive relationship between the two variables can be established.
Overall, regression tests produced no P-values among independent variables and capital ratios
that are low enough to reject the null hypothesis. This indicates that in the sample, there is no
relationship between equity percentage and the three capital ratios. It should be noted that a regression
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test was done using the natural logarithm of salary. The natural logarithm of salary was used to more
evenly distribute salary data. These results also found no P-values low enough to reject the null
hypothesis. This regression test was not shown in the paper because the natural logarithm of salary was
highly correlated with equity percentage indicating that they were too similar of measures.

6.) CONCLUSION
This paper examines the relationship between executive compensation and capital ratios at
banks in the US. Executive compensation is divided by cash based forms of compensation (salary and
bonus) and incentive-based compensation (equity) given to the executive. The sample covers the years
2012-2013 and includes the 43 largest publicly traded banks in the US. Executive compensation data was
used from the year 2012 whereas capital ratios were found for the executive’s respective banks for the
year 2013. This ensured enough time would be given to see the possible effect of a compensation
structure on capital ratios at an executive’s respective bank. The hypothesis of this paper was that the
higher incentive based compensation, the lower the capital ratios. Lower capital ratios indicate a higher
capital risk at banks.
This paper found no relationship significant enough to make a conclusion about executive
compensation forms and capital ratios at bank. No relationship was established between these two
variables based on data found on banks used in the sample. Unfortunately, the beginning hypothesis of
this paper was unable to be proven correct based on results from regression analysis.
There are many possible explanations for why no relationship significant enough was found, but
one reason seems to stand out from the rest. The sample pulled data from the 43 largest banks in the
US based on asset size. Some of these banks have asset sizes of more than $1 trillion. But in addition to
large banks, there are also many smaller community and regional banks that operate within the US. An
article, published by MSNBC, discussed the asset size of the largest banks in America based on
information provided by the Fed. The article states that in total, the five institutions—JPMorgan
Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup and U.S. Bancorp—had just under $7 trillion in total
assets as of the end of 2014. That's good for 44.61 percent of the industry total. It also leaves the other
55.4 percent of the assets to be divided up among 6,504 other institutions21 (MSNBC). This means that
the asset size of many of these smaller banks is much less than the largest banks in America.
Due to their small asset size, these banks may operate differently than the largest banks in the
US. For example, many of these community banks only operate within certain regions, states, or parts of
states. But these larger banks operate nationally and globally and in turn require more people to help
meet the needs of customers throughout the globe. This means that CEOs at larger have a bigger staff
and more people around them to help make decisions because of the asset size of the bank. CEOs at
smaller banks have much more control, as these banks have less assets and don’t require the large staff
that banks with trillions of dollars in assets require.
The sample in this paper came from the forty three largest banks in America and no relationship
could be established between executive compensation and capital ratios at these banks. But this paper
did not look at smaller banks where CEOs have greater control over the daily operations of the bank.
The management staff at larger banks may have more people compared to the management staff at
21
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some of the smaller banks. That means that the CEO at smaller banks has a wider focus and may have
more of an impact on daily operations than the CEO at a larger bank who has an entire management
staff to help them make decisions. This may point to the reason why a relationship could not be
established using these larger banks. Executive compensation practices may have more of an effect on
capital ratios at smaller banks than practices do at larger banks. There’s simply more activity that goes
on at these larger banks, and changing the CEOs compensation to include more or less incentive pay
may not cause the same outcome that it does at a smaller bank.
In addition, there may be other important factors beyond how the board compensates the CEO
that are needed in determining capital ratios and bank risk. One factor can be the fact that at large
banks, capital ratios are more dependent on regulator and credit rating agency’s requirements than on
CEO compensation structure. Because of their large asset sizes and the general societal dependence on
these large banks, these banks are constantly regulated and rated more than a smaller bank would be.
Constant regulation causes these banks to focus on other daily activities, other than simple CEO
compensation structure, that affect capital ratios. Regulators work with banks to ensure that risk-based
capital requirements are met during the year.
With that being said, there are many future improvements that can be made to this research
topic that this paper did not cover. Most notably, a study could be done using different sized banks in
the US. This paper did not take into account the smaller banks in the US and this may have caused
certain results to occur. However, future improvements could be done to include these small
community banks into the sample. One way to do this is to simply include all publicly-traded banks in
the US. This would allow for a sample to include banks of a wide range of asset sizes in a sample, and
may cause a change in the results. In addition, adding a wider range of years to the sample may improve
results as well. This would allow for an increase in the data size which may change results. It would also
allow for different years to be compared to the effect of regulation on executive compensation. For
example, Basel III was enacted in 2011 and set minimum capital ratios. Comparing years before and
after 2011 would give insight to how well the regulation is having a positive impact on banks.
Overall, this paper found no relationship significant enough to make a conclusion about the
relationship between executive compensation and capital ratios at banks. The fact that no statistical
relationship was found may be a positive sign for current and future regulation. This paper was only
concerned with CEO compensation variables and capital ratios between the years 2012 and 2013. This
paper did not look at CEO compensation structure or capital ratios before the financial crisis in 2008.
Before the crisis in 2008, both CEO compensation structure and capital ratios may have been different.
Capital ratios most likely were low and CEO compensation was most likely still very high indicating that
CEOs were still getting compensated with a lot of cash and equity but banks were running daily
operations with a lot of risk. It was shown in the descriptive statistics that even the lowest capital ratios
within the sample still met regulatory requirements which were set in the years following the crisis.
Capital ratios at the banks that are controlling almost half of the total country’s deposits are meeting
regulatory requirements and keeping capital risk low. This ensures that CEOs and other upper level
management at large banks are keeping daily operations running smoothly and preventing capital ratios
from going to low. Total CEO Compensation at large banks still remains high, but capital ratios also
remain high which points to the fact that government regulation is continuing to keep bank risk low and
working towards preventing future financial crises.
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